Blow sh was proposed by Schneier in the Cambridge Security Workshop 6] . It appears to be a very fast encryption function when we always use the same private key. It is based on the Feistel cipher 4]. Di erential cryptanalysis 3] is known to be one of the most powerful attack on this kind of cipher. The design of Blow sh includes the new feature that the s-boxes are randomly generated from the private key. Hence, for some particular weak keys, a di erential cryptanalysis may be successful. This paper shows the rst analysis of Blow sh, as an answer to the Dr Dobb's Journal Blow sh Cryptanalysis Contest proposed in 7].
Blow sh
Blow sh encrypts a 64-bit plaintext into a 64-bit ciphertext using a variable key length 6]. The encryption proceeds with a suggested number of ? Laboratoire d'Informatique de l'Ecole Normale Sup erieure, research group a liated with the CNRS t = 16 rounds. In the following, we may consider a smaller number of rounds t. First, the key is expanded into a 4168-bytes key following a scheduling scheme which works as a pseudo-random generator. As this scheme is very complicated, one has to store de nitely the expanded key. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the expanded key as the real key in the attack.
The expanded key consists of:
t + 2 32-bit constants P 1 ; : : : ; P t+2 ; four arrays of 256 32-bit values which describe four s-boxes S 1 ; : : : ; S 4 with 8-bit inputs and 32-bit outputs. The four s-boxes de ne a 32-bit to 32-bit function F by
where is the bit-wise xor and + is the addition modulo 2 32 and abcd] is the concatenated bit string of the four 8-bit strings a, b, c and d.
The plaintext P = (L 0 ; R 0 ) is divided into two 32-bit halves. Each round is de ned recursively following the Feistel scheme by
the ciphertext is C = (R t P t+2 ; L t P t+1 ) (the left and right registers are not exchanged for the nal round).
2 Known F -weak key attack All through this paper, the term weak key means there exists an s-box, say S 1 , which has a collision. That is to say, there exist two di erent bytes a and a 0 such that S 1 (a) = S 1 (a 0 ). In this section, we assume the opponent knows the part of the private key which describes the F function, that is the four s-boxes. (in fact, we only need to know a and a 0 to recover seven bits of information on the private key.)
Let denote the xor-di erence of the collision of S 1 (that is = a a 0 with the previous notation) We consider the following iterative characteristic. -
? ?
(Throughout this paper, gures represent 8-bit values so that 000] is a 32-bit value.) Assuming there is only one collision for S 1 with di erence , the probability of this characteristic is 2 ?7 .
For Blow sh reduced to t = 8 rounds, we iterate this characteristic three times as shown on gure 1 (xyzt represents an undetermined value). The resulting characteristic has probability 2 ?21 . Hence, trying 2 21 chosen plaintext pairs with xor 0000 000], we easily detect a ciphertext pair (C; C 0 ) with xor 000xyzt]. Note that for a random pair, the probability of getting such an xor is 2 ?32 . So, a detected pair with the good xor is certainly a good pair.
With such a pair, let denote C = (L; R). Since we have F (L P 10 ) F (L P 10 000]) = xyzt] we can try exhautively all the 2 32 possible P 10 until this equation holds. It is easy to check that Blow sh with t rounds and a known P t+2 is equivalent to Blow sh with t ? 1 rounds. So, this attack allows to reduce the cipher to t = 7 rounds.
More generally, for Blow sh with t rounds, the same iterated characteristic has probability 2 ?7 d 3 Known F -random key attack As in the previous section, we assume the description of the F function has been disclosed, but the private key is not necessarily supposed to be weak. 0000 00
Assuming there is only one collision for S 1 + S 2 with di erence , the probability of this characteristic is 2 ?15 . Hence, for Blow sh with t = 8 rounds, this characteristic iterated as on gure 1 has probability 2 ?45 , and 2 46 chosen plaintext pairs include two good pairs and 2 14 wrong pairs. So, the good value of P 10 may be the only value suggested twice.
The attack on t = 7 rounds has the same complexity, so the number of plaintexts required is 2 48 .
Weak key detection
What can we do without the description of F ? We can try to detect whether a key is weak or not. For a random s-box S 1 , the probability that there is no collision is there are 2 7 pairs with the good xor. Let C = C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5 C 6 C 7 C 8 ] be the corresponding ciphertexts. In a good pair, we notice that X = (B 5 C 5 )C 6 C 7 C 8 ] must be the same for both messages of the pair. Thus, we can seek for pairs in the structure which makes X collide. If there are no good pairs, this occurs with probability roughly 2 ?17:0 . Trying 2 14 structures, we get one good pair with high probability, and no wrong pair with probability roughly 2 ?3 . Hence, with 2 22 chosen plaintexts, we can detect a collision on S 1 and get the xor of the collision. The same attack holds for S 2 , S 3 and S 4 .
Conclusion
We have shown di erential cryptanalysis on Blow sh is possible either against a reduced number of rounds or with the piece of information which describes the F function. This second case appears to be equivalent to an analysis done by Lee, Heys and Tavares 5] against the CAST cipher 1, 2]. In the analysis of CAST, the s-boxes are well design to resist to any attack while they are randomly generated in Blow sh. Compared to CAST, some of the s-boxes generated by Blow sh may be really weak, but it is not sure whether it is su cient to mount an attack since they are supposed to be private.
We studied weaknesses of the s-boxes based on collisions. This way, we proved there are weak keys in Blow sh that enable to decrease signi cantly the complexity of the attacks (from 2 48 to 2 23 on eight rounds when F is known). We also showed it is possible to detect weak keys using 2 22 chosen plaintexts (on eight rounds).
